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Critics have raised a number of theoretical and
historical objections to the gold standard. Some
have called the gold standard a “crazy” idea. 
The gold standard is not a flawless monetary
system. Neither is the fiat money alternative. In
light of historical evidence about the compara-
tive magnitude of these flaws, however, the gold
standard is a policy option that deserves serious
consideration.
In a study covering many decades in a large
sample of countries, Federal Reserve Bank econ-
omists found that “money growth and inflation
are higher” under fiat standards than under
gold and silver standards. Nor is the gold stan-
dard a source of harmful deflation. Alan Green-
span has testified before Congress that “a cen-
tral bank properly functioning will endeavor to,
in many cases, replicate what a gold standard
would itself generate.” 
This study addresses the leading criticisms of
the gold standard, relating to the costs of gold,
the costs of transition, the dangers of specula-
tion, and the need for a lender of last resort. One
criticism is found to have some merit. The
United States would not enjoy the benefits of
being on an international gold standard if it were
the first and only country whose currency was
linked to gold. 
A gold standard does not guarantee perfect
steadiness in the growth of the money supply, but
historical comparison shows that it has provided
more moderate and steadier money growth in
practice than the present-day alternative, politi-
cally empowering a central banking committee to
determine growth in the stock of fiat money. 
From the perspective of limiting money
growth appropriately, the gold standard is far
from a crazy idea. 
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Introduction
For the first time in many years, the mon-
etary arrangements of the United States have
become an issue in the 2008 presidential race.
The subprime crisis and the decline in the
foreign exchange value of the dollar have
raised questions about the performance of
the Federal Reserve Board. One candidate
has proposed ending the post-1971 experi-
ment with an unanchored fiat dollar issued
by the Federal Reserve and returning to a
gold standard with private money issue.
Critics have raised a number of theoretical
and historical objections to the gold stan-
dard. Some have called the gold standard a
“crazy” idea. In what follows I consider the
leading objections and find all but one of
them weak. 
The overall intent of this paper is to make
practical institutional comparisons, warts
and all. The gold standard is not a flawless
monetary system. Neither is the fiat money
alternative. The gold standard is most cer-
tainly not a crazy idea. It is a policy option
that deserves serious consideration.
“The gold standard” generically means a
monetary system in which a certain mass of
gold defines the monetary unit (e.g., the dol-
lar) and serves as the ultimate medium of
redemption. For example, during the “classi-
cal” gold standard period (1879–1914), the
U.S. dollar was defined as 0.048 troy oz. of
pure gold. Inverting the defined ratio, one
ounce of pure gold was equivalent to
US$20.67. Gold coins need not, and histori-
cally did not, form the predominant medium
of exchange. Issuers of paper currency and
checkable deposits, normally private com-
mercial banks but also a government central
bank if one exists, make their notes re-
deemable for gold and hold gold coins and
bullion as reserves for meeting redemption
demands. Because of the banks’ contractual
obligation to redeem in gold, the volume of
paper currency and deposits—the everyday
means of payment—is geared to the volume
of gold.
Key Objections
“A gold standard leaves the quantity of
money to be determined by accidental
forces.” There is a germ of truth to this con-
cern. A gold standard does leave the quantity
and purchasing power of money to be deter-
mined by the forces of supply and demand in
the market for gold. There can be “accidental”
shifts in the supply and demand curves to
which the quantity and purchasing power of
money will respond. Our current fiat standard,
by contrast, leaves the supply of money to the
decisions of a committee (namely, the Federal
Open Market Committee of the Federal Re-
serve System). The practical question is: under
which system are the quantity and purchasing
power of money better behaved?
As is well known, the stock of gold did not
grow at a perfectly steady rate during the era of
the historical gold standard. Some increases in
gold output—such as the Yukon discoveries
and the development of the cyanide process—
were responses to previous increases in demand
and the purchasing power of gold, and thus
helped to stabilize the purchasing power of
gold over the long run.1 Other increases result-
ed from accidental discoveries. 
The largest such “supply shock” in the
19th century was the 1848 discovery of gold
in California. The California gold rush
meant that more ounces would be mined at
any given purchasing power of gold. The out-
pouring of gold from California reduced the
purchasing power of gold around the world,
or in other words, generated an inflation of
the price level. But how large an inflation?
The magnitude was surprisingly small. Even
over the most inflationary interval, the gen-
eral price index (the GDP deflator) for the
United States rose from 5.71 in 1849 (year
2000 = 100) to 6.42 in 1857, an increase of
12.4 percent spread over eight years. The
compound annual price inflation rate over
those eight years was slightly less than 1.5
percent. Twenty-two years later, when the
gold standard was finally restored following
its suspension during the Civil War, the pur-
2
The gold 





chasing power of gold had actually risen
slightly (the price level was slightly lower).2
The economic historian Hugh Rockoff, in
an examination of the output of gold, con-
cluded that “it is fair to describe the fluctua-
tions in the supply of gold under the classical
standard as small and well-timed.”3 He found
that supply of fiat money in the postwar peri-
od (1949–79), by contrast to the behavior of
gold under the classical gold standard, had
both higher annual rates of growth and a
higher standard deviation of annual growth
rates around decade averages.
In a study covering many decades in a large
sample of countries, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis economists Arthur Rolnick and
Warren Weber4 similarly found that “money
growth and inflation are higher” under fiat
standards than under gold and silver standards.
Specifically, they reported that
the average inflation rate for the fiat
standard observations is 9.17 percent
per year; the average inflation rate for
the commodity standard observations
is 1.75 percent per year.5
This result was not driven by a few
extreme cases; in fact, in computing the aver-
age rates of inflation Rolnick and Weber
deliberately omitted cases of hyperinflation
(which occurred only under fiat money). Still,
they noted,
every country in our sample experienced
a higher rate of inflation in the period
during which it was operating under a
fiat standard than in the period during
which it was operating under a com-
modity standard.6
The evidence thus indicates that growth in
the stock of gold has been slower and steadier
in practice than growth in the stock of fiat
money. Of course, U.S. inflation is thankfully
not as high as 9 percent today, but at 4.3 per-
cent (consumer price index, year-over-year) it is
currently more than twice as high as Rolnick
and Weber’s figure for commodity standards.
Correspondingly, the purchasing power of
money under the gold standard was steadier
and more predictable. The greater reliability of
the purchasing power of the monetary unit
under the gold standard was reflected in a
thicker market for long-term corporate bonds
than exists today. Under a gold standard, the
price level can be trusted not to wander far
over the next 30 years because it is constrained
by impersonal market forces. Any sizable price
level increase (fall in the purchasing power of
gold) caused by a reduced demand to hold
gold would reduce the quantity of gold mined,
thereby reversing the price level movement.
Conversely, any sizable price level decrease (rise
in the purchasing power of gold) caused by an
increased demand to hold gold would increase
the quantity mined, thereby reversing that
price level movement. Under a fiat standard,
the future price level depends on the personal-
ities of yet-to-be-appointed monetary authori-
ties and thus is anybody’s guess.
The blogger Megan McArdle thus gets
things almost exactly backward when she
writes: “The gold standard cannot do what a
well-run fiat currency can do, which is to tailor
the money supply to the economy’s demand
for money.”7 Under the gold standard, market
forces do in fact automatically tailor the money
supply to the economy’s demand for money.
The economics of gold mining operates to
match world supply with world demand at the
stable price level (though admittedly large
demand shocks can take years to be accommo-
dated), while the “Price-specie-Flow mecha-
nism” quickly brings gold from the rest of the
world into any single country where demand
for money has grown. We can only imagine a
well-run fiat-currency-issuing central bank try-
ing to match these properties. We cannot
observe any central bank that has actually
managed it. Peter Bernholz, for example, tells
us that “a study of about 30 currencies shows
that there has not been a single case of a cur-
rency freely manipulated by its government or
central bank since 1700 which enjoyed price
stability for at least 30 years running.”8
Some critics have posed absurd-case sce-








lead into gold?” and “What if a golden mete-
orite hit the earth?” But these are of no more
actual relevance than “What if the Federal
Reserve chairman becomes insane?”
“A gold standard would be a source of
harmful deflation.” The inflation rate under
the gold standard averaged close to zero over
generations, sometimes slightly positive and
sometimes slightly negative over individual
decades. Rolnick and Weber, as quoted above,
found an average inflation rate of 1.75 percent
over the sample of gold and silver episodes
reported in the published version of their
paper; an earlier version using a different sam-
ple arrived at an average rate of -0.5 percent. In
1879 the United States resumed gold redemp-
tion for the U.S. dollar, which had been sus-
pended since the Civil War. Between 1880 and
1900 the United States experienced one of the
most prolonged periods of deflation on record.
The price level trended more or less steadily
downward, beginning at 6.10 and ending at
5.49 (GDP deflator, base year 2000 = 100). That
works out to a total decline of 10 percent
stretched over 20 years. The deflationary peri-
od was no disaster for the real economy. Real
output per capita began the period at $3,379
and ended it at $4,943 (both in 2000 dollars).
Total real per capita growth was thus a more-
than-healthy 46 percent. (Real GDP itself more
than doubled.)9
Monetary economists distinguish a benign
deflation (due to the output of goods grow-
ing rapidly while the stock of money grows
slowly, as in the 1880-1900 period) from a
harmful deflation (due to unanticipated
shrinkage in the money stock). The gold
standard was a source of mild benign defla-
tion in periods when the output of goods
grew faster than the stock of gold. Prices par-
ticularly fell for those goods whose produc-
tion enjoyed great technological improve-
ment (for example oil and steel after 1880).
Strong growth of real output, for particular
goods or in general, cannot be considered
harmful. 
It would be possible for the central bank
under a fiat money standard to offset produc-
tivity-driven declines in some prices by expand-
ing the quantity of money in order to drive oth-
ers prices upward, thus eliminating deflation
“on average.” But there is no social benefit in
doing so. Falling costs of production in steel
(i.e. productivity gains) do not discourage
investment in steel. A gradual anticipated
deflation does not discourage investment,
especially not when productivity gains are dri-
ving growth in the first place.10
Nor does a deflation penalize debtors once
it comes to be anticipated, because nominal
interest rates adjust downward to reflect antic-
ipated repayment in dollars of higher pur-
chasing power. 
“The gold standard was responsible for
the U.S. banking panics of the late 19th
century and for the monetary contraction
of 1929–33 and, thereby, for the Great
Depression.” The U.S. monetary contraction
of 1929–33 is the prime example of a harmful
deflation. It should be noted that it happened
on the Federal Reserve’s watch. The episode
should not be blamed on the gold standard,
but on the combination of a weak banking
system and a befuddled central bank. The U.S.
banking system was prone to runs and panics
in the late 19th century and continued to be so
through the 1929–33 episode in which the Fed
stood by and did not supply replacement
reserves to keep the money stock from con-
tracting. Other countries on the gold stan-
dard—Canada, for example—had no banking
panic in 1929–33 (nor did Canada have panics
in the late 19th century), so the gold standard
couldn’t have been responsible for the panics.
Rather the panics were due to completely
avoidable legal restrictions (namely the ban on
branch banking and compulsory bond collat-
eral requirements that make the supply of
banknotes “inelastic”) that weakened the U.S.
banking system.
“The benefit of a gold standard (restrain-
ing inflation) is attainable at less cost by
properly controlling the supply of fiat
money.” Although growth in the stock of fiat
money could in principle be as slow (or slower)
than growth in the stock of gold under a gold














Alan Greenspan actually used to recom-
mend controlling the fiat money supply to
mimic the price-level behavior of a gold stan-
dard. In response to questioning at a 2001
congressional hearing, Greenspan said: “Mr.
Chairman, so long as you have fiat currency,
which is a statutory issue, a central bank prop-
erly functioning will endeavor to, in many
cases, replicate what a gold standard would
itself generate.” Two years later he added that
central banks had created the inflation of the
1970s because the gold standard no longer
constrained them, but they had been able to
bring inflation back down by belatedly learn-
ing to emulate the restrained money growth
that was characteristic of the gold standard:
The general wisdom during the period
subsequent to the 1930s was that as we
moved to an essentially fiat money stan-
dard, that there was no anchor to the
general price level. And indeed, what we
subsequently observed is, as you point
out, a very marked increase in general
price levels, indeed, around the world as
we removed ourselves from commodity
standards, and specifically gold.
I had always thought that the fiat
money system was chronically and in-
evitably an inflation vehicle, and indeed,
said so repeatedly. I have been quite sur-
prised, and I must say pleased, by the fact
that central bankers have been able to
effectively simulate many of the charac-
teristics of the gold standard by con-
straining the degree of finance in a man-
ner which effectively has brought down
general price levels.11
Fiat money regimes have not, however,
accomplished price stability as fully as did the
gold standard. Although inflation is less severe
today than it was 30 years ago, experienced
inflation rates, and the expectations of future
inflation rates embodied in long-term interest
rates, have remained higher than correspond-
ing rates under the classical gold standard. 
It is true that a commodity money standard
entails a resource cost (sometimes described as
“digging up gold just to bury it in bank vaults”).
So does the production of bicycle locks from
metal rather than paper. The resource cost of a
gold standard has often been exaggerated by
estimates that assume 100 percent gold back-
ing for all forms of money. The preeminent
monetary economist Milton Friedman, during
the 1950s and 1960s, relied on such an estimate
in judging a well-run fiat standard more effi-
cient than a commodity standard.12 Friedman
overestimated the resource costs of a gold stan-
dard by assuming—although such a system has
no advocates and no historical precedent—100
percent reserves against all components of M2
(that is, against even time deposits). With a his-
torically more reasonable fractional reserve
ratio of 2 percent, the amount of gold needed in
vaults and thus the resource cost of a gold stan-
dard shrinks by a factor of 50.13
Friedman wanted to substitute for gold a
less costly paper money standard bound by a
strict money growth rule. But in the 1980s he
changed his mind about the feasibility of get-
ting the Fed to commit to anything of the sort,
reconsidered the costs of inflation in the
absence of a strict rule,14 and began to call for
abolishing the Federal Reserve System (though
not replacing it with a gold standard, because
he thought no government would any longer
consent to be constrained by a gold standard).15
Abolishing the Fed may be a pipe dream, but
for those who have that dream a gold standard
may be the most plausible way of abolishing the
Fed. As Greenspan recently explained to Daily
Show host Jon Stewart, under a gold standard a
central bank is unnecessary.16
“A gold standard is no restraint at all,
because government can devalue or sus-
pend gold redemption whenever it wants.”
A similar claim could be made about any
(other) restraint in the Constitution. And yet
constitutional rules are useful. By authorizing
only a limited set of government activities, rul-
ing others simply out of bounds, they save the
public the trouble of trying to weigh every
potential activity on a cost-benefit basis.
An important problem in fiat money
regimes, as famously identified by Finn












an enforceable commitment not to use sur-
prise monetary expansion and resulting infla-
tion as a temporary stimulus to the economy.17
When the public knows that the central bank
would be tempted to use surprise inflation, the
public rationally expects higher-than-optimal
inflation. The central bank has to deliver high-
er-than-optimal inflation to avoid a negative
surprise. An unfortunate standoff is reached at
a higher-than-optimal inflation rate (which,
being fully anticipated, provides no economic
stimulus). A gold standard avoids that trap.18
Like tying Ulysses to the mast, it achieves better
results by removing the option (to use surprise
inflation) that leads to ruin. Of course, a gold
standard is not the only possible rule for con-
straining the creation of money. Alternatives
include a Friedman-type money-growth rule,
or an inflation targeting rule. But the gold
standard has a longer history, and is the only
historically tested rule that does not presup-
pose a central bank.
Leaving money issue in the hands of pri-
vate banks rather than a government institu-
tion, as the United States did before 1913,
removes the option to use surprise monetary
expansion one step further. It remains true
that government can suspend the gold stan-
dard in an emergency, as both sides did during
the Civil War, but the spirit of the gold stan-
dard calls for returning to the parity afterward,
as did the United States.19 Judging by long-
term interest rates and the thick market for
long-term bonds under the post-bellum classi-
cal gold standard, the risk of permanent deval-
uation or suspension was considered small. 
“A gold standard, like any fixed ex-
change-rate system, is vulnerable to specu-
lative attacks.” What opens the door to spec-
ulative attacks is a weak commitment to the
existing parity, whether in gold or any other
reserve currency. A central bank’s commitment
can be weak, and that is indeed a problem
when combining a gold standard with central
banking. Fortunately, a gold standard doesn’t
require a central bank. With decentralized pri-
vate money issue, there is no institution capa-
ble of devaluing, so there is no danger of spec-
ulative attacks on the parity. A gold standard
free of a central bank provides a commitment
to non-inflation made good by the impersonal
economics of gold mining (for gold itself) and
by enforceable redemption contracts and the
competitive market value of reputation (for
bank-issued money).20
“Fiat money is necessary so that a
lender of last resort can meet the liquidity
needs of the banking system.” History
shows that a lender of last resort would hard-
ly be needed, given a stable monetary regime
and a sound banking system (again it is
instructive to contrast the United States with
Canada in the 19th century). In the rare cases
such a lender might be needed, bank clear-
inghouses could play the role.21
“Switching to a gold standard would
involve massive transition costs.” The
transition cost involved in reestablishing a
gold definition for the dollar would be small.
Unlike with Europe’s transition to the euro,
price tags and bank accounts would not need
to be redenominated because the name “dol-
lar” would be retained. At the right reentry
rate, dollar prices would not need to jump.
“We must have gone off the gold stan-
dard in the first place for good reasons.” In
1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt deval-
ued from $20.67 to $35 per troy ounce of gold
as a means to re-inflate the dollar price level.
But the (harmful) money stock shrinkage and
price deflation of 1929–33 hadn’t been due to
a loss of gold. It had been due to a collapse of
weak U.S. banks. The deflation could have
been remedied by better monetary policy and
banking reform without going off gold. In
1971, Nixon shut the gold window because
the Federal Reserve had expanded the stock of
dollars too much to maintain the $35 per
ounce parity. Nixon’s action could have been
avoided had the Fed not expanded the stock of
dollars so much in the 1960s. It was not the
rules of the gold standard that had failed. It
was, rather, the Fed that had failed to abide by
the rules of the gold standard.
“The gold standard is an example of
price-fixing by government.” The gold stan-
dard doesn’t fix a price between dollars and
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surement system fixes a price between pints and
quarts. The fixed relationship is a matter of def-
inition. A gold standard defines the dollar (or
whatever the name of the monetary unit) as a
specified mass of gold. Dollars are not separate
goods from gold.
“A gold standard would allow Putin to
buy the United States.” Any Russian auto-
crat’s ability to use the proceeds from Russian
gold mines to buy American assets would be no
greater under a gold standard than it is today,
unless the purchasing power of gold were to
rise. And there is no good reason to think that
would happen. The real purchasing power of
gold today, under fiat money, is higher than it
was before 1971, in large part because people
are hoarding gold as a hedge against fiat money
inflation. The current fiat system is enriching
Putin more than a gold standard would.
“There isn’t enough gold.” There is nec-
essarily enough gold to support enough dol-
lars to support today’s dollar price level (or
whatever price level is desired), at the right
gold definition of the dollar. 
“The United States can’t recreate the clas-
sical international gold standard by itself.” I
have saved for last what I think is the strongest
objection to unilateral return to gold on the
part of the United States. The nation would not
enjoy the benefits of being on an international
gold standard if it were the first and only coun-
try whose currency was linked to gold. At least
two major benefits would be missing: (1) the
United States would not enjoy fixed exchange
rates with the rest of the world, and (2) the pur-
chasing power of gold would not be as stable.
The purchasing power (or relative price) of
today’s demonetized gold has been much less
stable than that of gold under the 19th centu-
ry’s global gold standard, because demand to
hold gold today is largely a speculative rather
than a transactions demand. With only one
economy on gold—albeit a large economy—
monetary use of gold would likely remain the
tail rather than the dog. Thus even in the
unlikely event that the United States were to
elect a president committed to a pro-gold poli-
cy, that president would be prudent to try to
cultivate similar commitments from the gov-
ernments of the other leading economies of the
world before taking us down the yellow brick
road alone.
Conclusion
Under the gold standard the issue of com-
mon money by banks is restrained by the cost of
acquiring gold, which is determined by imper-
sonal supply and demand forces in the gold-
mining market. Because of the issuers’ contrac-
tual obligations to redeem in gold, and corre-
sponding prudential need to hold gold reserves,
the dollar volume of paper currency and
deposits—the stock of money—is geared to the
volume of gold. Growth in the stock of money is
governed by market forces rather than by gov-
ernment fiat. A gold standard does not guaran-
tee perfect steadiness in the growth of the money
supply, but historical comparison shows that it
has provided more moderate and steadier
money growth in practice than the present-day
alternative, politically empowering a central
banking committee to determine growth in the
stock of fiat money. From the perspective of lim-
iting money growth appropriately, the gold
standard is far from a crazy idea.
Historical problems of U.S. banking insta-
bility, sometimes blamed on the gold standard,
turn out on closer inspection to have had been
rooted in banking regulations that inadvertent-
ly weakened U.S. banks. Gold standard coun-
tries like Canada that avoided the peculiar
banking restrictions of the United States
(namely the ban on branch banking and com-
pulsory bond collateral requirements that
make the supply of banknotes “inelastic”) also
avoided the instability. As we discovered in the
greatest banking panic, that of 1929–33, having
a Federal Reserve System capable of overriding
the gold standard did not eliminate the prob-
lem of weakness in the U.S. banking system.
Other supposed historical problems, like
price deflation due to goods production out-
growing gold production, turn out not to
have been actual problems.
A gold standard does entail resource costs
of mining the gold that is lodged in bank
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vaults. But so too does a fiat standard entail
resource costs, primarily in the form of the
deadweight costs of inflation. All in all, because
the costs of a gold standard are reasonably
small in relation to its benefits, the gold stan-
dard is not a crazy idea.
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